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Marta Lachowska and Stephen A. Woodbury
Labor Force Participation 
in Mississippi and Other 
Southern States
The labor force participation rate 
(LFPR) is a key social indicator. Along 
with the unemployment rate, the LFPR is 
of paramount concern to states because 
work and earnings from employment are 
central determinants of living standards.
The LFPR varies dramatically 
among the states. In 2011, the LFPR 
was less than 60 percent in three states 
(Mississippi, Alabama, and West 
Virginia) and greater than 72 percent 
in two (North Dakota and Minnesota). 
Because the state of Mississippi has 
historically had one of the lowest LFPRs 
in the United States, in August 2011, 
the Mississippi Governor’s Offi ce 
commissioned the Upjohn Institute 
to study the reasons for Mississippi’s 
relatively low LFPR. This article 
summarizes the main fi ndings of the 
Institute’s research. (For a complete 
description of the work with additional 
references, see Lachowska and Woodbury 
[2012a,b.]) 
The LFPR gap between Mississippi 
and other states is longstanding. Figure 
1 shows time series of the LFPRs of 
Mississippi and a group of 12 states—
referred to as the Blueprint states—
chosen by the state of Mississippi to craft 
its “Blueprint Mississippi,” an economic 
development effort sponsored by the 
Mississippi Economic Council of the 
Mississippi Chamber of Commerce. The 
Blueprint states include the four states 
contiguous with Mississippi (Louisiana, 
Arkansas, Tennessee, and Alabama), plus 
Texas, Oklahoma, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Kentucky, Georgia, and Florida.
Figure 1 shows that LFPRs in 
Mississippi and the Blueprint states 
trended upward from the mid 1970s 
until the mid 1990s, following a broad 
national trend (Aaronson, Davis, and Hu 
2012). Since the mid 1990s the LFPRs 
in Mississippi and the Blueprint states 
have all fallen—a trend that started even 
before the recession of 2001. The fi gure 
also shows that, throughout this time 
period, Mississippi’s LFPR has been 3–4 
percentage points below the LFPR of the 
Blueprint states, and that Mississippi’s 
LFPR dropped by nearly 2 percentage 
points following Hurricane Katrina in 
August 2005, temporarily creating an 
even larger than usual gap between 
Mississippi and the Blueprint states.
Of fi ve key differences between 
Mississippi and the Blueprint 
states, the most dramatic 
is that nearly 60 percent of 
Mississippi’s residents lived 
in nonmetropolitan areas in 
2009, compared with 19 
percent in the Blueprint states.
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Figure 1  Labor Force Participation Rates in Mississippi and the Blueprint States, 
1976–2010
Labor Force Participation Rates of 
Population Subgroups
We follow a long tradition in the 
analysis of labor force participation and 
examine fi ve subgroups of the civilian 
noninstitutional population (see Figure 2):
1) Men, ages 25–54, sometimes 
called “prime-age males,” who have 
traditionally been the most active 
labor force participants, with LFPRs 
approaching 90 percent in some years.
2) Married women, ages 25–54, who 
showed dramatic growth in labor force 
participation in the years following 
World War II, as they substituted work 
in the labor market for work at home, 
and whose LFPRs are now within 10–15 
percentage points of prime-age males.
3) Single women (never married, 
divorced, and widowed), ages 25–54, 
who have long had LFPRs approaching 
those of prime-age men.
4) Older persons, ages 55 and older, 
who have the lowest LFPRs of the 















NOTE: Light blue bars indicate recessions as defi ned by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. The pink bar indicates 2005, the year of Hurricane Katrina. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics. 
5) Younger persons, ages 16–24, who 
have lower LFPRs than people ages 25–
54 partly because they are still in school 
(or other training), and partly because 
they have less human capital and earnings 
capacity than older people and have 
limited opportunities in the labor market.
Figure 2 shows that, except in the 
case of married women, the LFPRs of 
the Mississippi population are lower than 
those in the Blueprint states. 
Key Differences between Mississippi 
and the Blueprint States
The LFPR differences between 
residents of Mississippi and the Blueprint 
states may be attributable to a range 
of factors, some measurable, others 
diffi cult to quantify. We focus on fi ve key 
differences between Mississippi and the 
Blueprint states:
1) Nonmetropolitan residence
Of the fi ve potentially relevant 
differences, the most dramatic is that 
nearly 60 percent of Mississippi’s 
residents lived in nonmetropolitan areas 
in 2009, compared with 19 percent in 
the Blueprint states (see Figure 3). This 
difference may be important because 
residents of nonmetropolitan areas 
have signifi cantly lower LFPRs than 
do residents of metropolitan areas—
about 65 percent in metropolitan areas 
versus 57 percent in nonmetropolitan 
areas. Accordingly, Mississippi’s mix 
of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
residents—which is skewed toward 
nonmetropolitan residents—is one likely 
explanation of the LFPR gap between 
Mississippi and the Blueprint states.
2) Race
The Mississippi population has a 
signifi cantly higher percentage of black 
residents (36 percent) than the Blueprint 
states (18.5 percent). This difference 
matters because most groups of the 
black population have lower LFPRs than 
their white counterparts. For example, 
the LFPR of black men 25–54 in the 
Blueprint states is nearly 77 percent, 
compared with nearly 89 percent for 
white men. (The LFPR gap between 
black and white men in Mississippi is 
even larger.) Only for married women 
25–54 is the LFPR of blacks greater than 
that of whites.
3) Incidence of health problems
A third set of differences between 
Mississippi and the Blueprint states 
is that Mississippi residents report a 
higher incidence of health problems. 
The American Community Survey 
asks questions about fi ve types of 
health issues: 1) cognitive diffi culties, 
2) ambulatory diffi culty, 3) diffi culty 
taking care of oneself, 4) diffi culty living 
independently, and 5) vision or hearing 
diffi culties. In most cases, Mississippi 
residents are more likely to report having 
one or more of these health diffi culties. 
Only in the case of younger persons are 
Mississippi residents and residents of 
the comparison states (approximately) 
equally likely to report having each of 
these health diffi culties. 
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4) Receipt of government transfers
Mississippi and the Blueprint states 
differ in the percentage of individuals 
who receive government transfers 
such as Social Security, Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), and Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance (or Food Stamps). 
• Among men 25–54, women 25–54 
(both married and single), and 
younger persons, the incidence of 
income from Social Security is higher 
in Mississippi than in the Blueprint 
states, usually by about 60 percent. 
• Similarly, the incidence of SSI 
receipt is higher in Mississippi than 
in the Blueprint states, usually by 50 
percent or more.
• The incidence of Food Stamp receipt 
is higher in Mississippi than in the 
Blueprint states among all groups, 
but most notably among single 
women 25–54 and younger persons, 
for whom Food Stamp receipt is 40 
percent higher in Mississippi.
Higher incidence of government transfers 
is usually related to lower LFPRs, either 
because recipients have fewer marketable 
skills or because the availability of 
nonwage income reduces the need to 
participate in the labor force. 
5) Educational attainment
Compared with the Blueprint states, 
a higher percentage of Mississippi 
residents had not completed high 
school, and a lower percentage were 
college graduates. These differences are 
potentially important because LFPRs 
tend to be higher for individuals with 
higher educational attainment: The LFPR 
of high school dropouts in Mississippi 
was only 35 percent in 2009, whereas 
the LFPR of high school graduates was 
nearly 60 percent, and the LFPR of those 
with some postsecondary education was 
70 percent or more. 
Accounting for LFPR Gaps between 
Mississippi and Other States
To what extent do the LFPR gaps 
between Mississippi and the Blueprint 
states refl ect the interstate differences 
just discussed? We answer this question 
using the well-known Blinder-Oaxaca 
technique, which decomposes the total 
LFPR gap between Mississippi and 
the Blueprint states into components 
attributable to (or “explained by”) various 
factors.
Table 1 summarizes the fi ndings. 
The Total LFPR Gap column shows the 
LFPR gap (in percentage points) between 
Mississippi and the Blueprint states in 
2009. For example, for men 25–54, the 
LFPR in Mississippi was 5.3 percentage 
points less than in the Blueprint states. 
Of this 5.3 point gap, 2.1 points can 
be attributed to the fact that a higher 
percentage of men 25–54 in Mississippi 
lived in nonmetropolitan areas, another 
1.2 points occurred because a higher 
percentage of Mississippi men are black, 
Figure 2  Labor Force Participation Rates of Population Subgroups in Mississippi 

























SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2009 American Community Survey, Integrated Public 
Use Microdata Series (ACS-IPUMS).
Figure 3  Differences between Mississippi and the Blueprint States in the 
Percentage of Residents Living Outside of Metropolitan Areas, 2009
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2009 ACS-IPUMS.
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another 1.0 point is due to a higher 
incidence of health problems among 
Mississippi men, and 0.9 point is related 
to a higher incidence of government 
transfers.
Table 1 suggests that the main reasons 
for Mississippi’s LFPR gap differ among 
the fi ve population groups: 
1) The relatively high concentration of 
Mississippi residents in nonmetropolitan 
areas is the most consistent reason for 
Mississippi’s lower LFPR. 
2) Mississippi’s relatively high 
percentage of black residents has a 
mixed impact on its LFPR. For men and 
younger persons, it tends to reduce the 
LFPR. For married women, it raises the 
LFPR because the LFPR of black married 
women exceeds that of white married 
women.
3) Higher incidence of health 
problems helps explain the lower LFPR 
of Mississippi’s men, women (both single 
and married), and older persons. 
4) Higher incidence of government 
transfer receipt helps explain the lower 
LFPR of Mississippi’s men and single 
women. 
5) Lower educational attainment 
reduces the LFPR of Mississippi’s single 
women, older persons, and younger 
persons.
For all but younger persons, the fi ve 
key measurable differences between 
Mississippi and the Blueprint states 
account for (or “explain”) most of 
the gap between Mississippi and 
the Blueprint states. However, for 
younger persons more than half of 
the gap must be attributed to cultural, 
historical, and institutional factors that 
are diffi cult to measure and quantify. 
The legacy of racial discrimination, the 
connection of Mississippi residents to 
rural communities, and an agricultural 
sector that is in long-term decline are all 
possible contributors. 
Policy Implications
The fi ndings may have three 
implications for policy. First, the 
connection between low LFPRs and 
nonmetropolitan residence provides 
a rationale for targeting regional 
economic development toward 
nonmetropolitan areas of Mississippi 
(see also Range [2011]). Such efforts 
at regional development could be 
augmented with efforts to connect 
workers in nonmetropolitan areas with 
job opportunities in urban areas that are 
relatively nearby, for example, through 
inexpensive and accessible transportation. 
Second, the connection between 
educational attainment and labor force 
participation provides a rationale for 
improving the quality of education 
generally and, more specifi cally, for 
creating opportunities for vocational and 
technical training in occupation-specifi c 
skills that employers indicate they 
demand. 
Third, for young persons culture and 
institutions play a large role in explaining 
the LFPR gap between Mississippi 
and other states. This suggests that 
special efforts may be needed to create 
employment opportunities for high school 
students in Mississippi, so that young 
people see the relevance of schooling 
to job opportunities and to gaining a 
foothold in the labor market. Policies 
that could be helpful include cooperative 
programs connecting school to work, and 
direct employer subsidies to encourage 
the hiring of young people. 
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Men 25–54 –5.3 –2.1 –1.2 –1.0 –0.9 —
Married women 25–54 +1.1 — +1.2a –0.7 — +0.3
Single women 25–54 –5.5 –1.7 — –0.8 –1.6 –0.9
Older persons –3.1 –1.2 — –1.1 — –0.7
Younger persons –4.1 –0.8 –1.2 — — –0.4
Table 1  Percentage Point LFPR Gaps Explained by Five Key Differences between 
Mississippi and the Blueprint States, by Population Subgroup
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Nancy Mohan and Ting Zhang
What Determines Public 
Pension Investment 
Risk-Taking Policy? 
See p. 7 for new and recent books on pension 
policy published by the Upjohn Institute.
State public pension plans, mostly 
defi ned benefi t plans, cover pension 
benefi ts for 12.8 million active public 
employees and 5.9 million retirees and 
other annuitants.1 However, by the 
end of 2009, public pension plans had 
accumulated a total funding defi cit of 
$697 billion (measured by the difference 
between actuarial pension assets and 
liabilities). On average, public pension 
funds cover 75 percent of their liabilities, 
but individual state results vary greatly. 
The 2008 stock market crash strongly 
affected pension asset value in that equity 
allocation on average accounted for 56 
percent of invested assets. The average 
2009 pension asset beta of 0.63 suggests 
that if the market fell 35 percent (the drop 
experienced during the 2008 fi nancial 
crisis), public plans would lose 22 
percent of their total fund value.2 
Therefore, an important yet largely 
overlooked issue related to pension 
underfunding is the investment risk 
level assumed by public pension plans. 
As shown in Figure 1, the state pension 
funds equity allocation varied greatly at 
the end of 2009, from 11 percent (South 
Carolina) to 69 percent (Nebraska and 
Mississippi). The current funding gap 
prompts the question of whether the 
pension fund managers will adopt riskier 
investment positions in hopes of raising 
returns and lowering the shortfall.3 
This article summarizes our research 
that is reported in our Upjohn Institute 
working paper (Mohan and Zhang 2012). 
In it, we examine the determinants 
of pension risk-taking policy during 
the period 2001–2009 after taking 
into consideration state government 
incentives, political pressure, fi scal 
constraints, public union presence, and 
workforce features. 
Factors Affecting Pension Funds 
Risk-Taking Policy
We measure pension risk as either 
the percentage of total plan assets 
invested in the equity market or pension 
asset beta. The more risk assumed 
by the fund manager (higher equity 
allocation or higher asset beta), the 
more sensitive the fund is to market 
volatility. So, what are the factors that 
could affect investment risk? One 
incentive may be risk management. 
When a pension fund is underfunded 
the state is obligated to increase 
contributions. Unexpected, required 
funding for pension contributions may 
reduce the ability to invest in schools 
or police, for example, because in the 
short run, the state/municipal budget 
is fi xed. The implications are that, 
from a risk management perspective, 
states would prefer to have predictable 
pension contributions. Accordingly, 
asset allocation decisions would be a 
function of funding status—safe, well-
funded plans could invest in more risky 
securities, while underfunded plans invest 
in less risky assets. Alternatively, there 
is a risk transfer element to consider: 
taxpayers are ultimately responsible for 
underfunded public pension plans, and 
governments may raise taxes to fund 
pension plans (Gold 2003). 
Other factors may also affect risk-
taking investment policy. Public pension 
plans have a unique set of issues to 
consider: politics, fi scal constraints, and 
public pension accounting. Political 
infl uence could pressure the fund 
to buy bonds issued by the state or 
local government or to direct funds to 
economically targeted investments. 
And if these investments provide 
ineffi cient returns, then remaining 
assets may be invested in riskier 
securities. Furthermore, if states face 
fi scal limitations that restrict borrowing, 
pension fund debt may act as a 
substitute (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009). 
Fiscal constraints also cause states to 
manipulate actuarial assumptions to 
lower required contributions (Eaton and 
Nofsinger 2004). Public pension plans 
are regulated by the government standard 
(GASB 25), which allows liabilities to 
be discounted at the assumed plan rate 
of return, which most commonly is 8 
percent. Higher assumed returns reduce 
the discounted liabilities, which in turn 
reduces the required contributions. 
Accordingly, we label these factors 
political infl uence, fi scal constraint, and 
accounting effect.
Finally, we consider union 
membership, demographic make-
up of employees, and follow-the-
leader investment behavior. If union 
membership is associated with higher 
pension obligations, investment policy 
could become riskier in order to chase 
higher returns. From a demographic 
perspective, age and gender of plan 
participants may affect the risk-
taking policy of the fund. In addition, 
investment managers tend to mimic 
each other. According to Park (2009), 
managers of public pension funds tend to 
follow peer group norms such that asset 
allocation to all equity hovers around 
64–75 percent. Alternatively, public 
pension plan managers may follow the 
best performers or plans considered to be 
large and infl uential, such as CalPERS. 
We name these factors union effect, 
demographic effect, and herding effect.
Summary of Our Results  
 
We fi nd that accounting standards 
strongly affect public fund investment 
risk, as higher return assumptions (used 
to discount pension liabilities) are 
associated with higher equity allocations 
and betas. In particular, a 100 basis point 
increase in pension return assumption 
is associated with a 1.72–4.51 percent 
increase in equity allocation. The 
corresponding increase in pension asset 
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beta given a same magnitude increase 
in the return assumption is 0.04–0.06, 
suggesting that an important incentive 
for the fund manager is justifying the 
liabilities discount rate. 
Our results also suggest that public 
funds assume more risk if they are 
underfunded or have lower investment 
returns in the previous year, evidence 
consistent with risk transfer or intent to 
pass underfunded pension obligations to 
future taxpayers. This risk-taking policy 
is not necessarily in the plan participants’ 
best interest. Taxpayers might ultimately 
be called upon to close the funding gap. 
When states are constrained from 
issuing additional debt, underfunding 
pension funds may substitute for 
borrowing. And because states can justify 
a higher discount rate for liabilities 
through the assumed rate of return, 
states facing fi nancial constraints may 
subsequently invest in riskier assets, 
resulting in higher pension plan betas 
and/or larger equity allocations. We 
fi nd that pension funds in states facing 
fi nancial constraints are more likely to 
take higher risk in their pension fund 
investment. 
Our results suggest a degree of 
follow-the-leader in that plan managers 
tend to follow the risk-investing policy 
of large and high-profi le plans (such as 
CalPERS). Furthermore, we report a 
mild public union effect; that is, in order 
to provide larger retirement benefi ts 
for unionized public employees, fund 
managers pursue a riskier investment 
allocation. Finally, limited evidence 
suggests that economically targeted 
investment policies are associated with 
lower pension investment risk. 
Overall, our fi ndings suggest that the 
risk levels of public pension funds are 
determined by various factors: incentives 
to justify the accounting discount rate 
choice, shifting pension risk to future 
tax payers, and substituting underfunded 
pension liabilities for borrowing. A fi rst 
step towards addressing the problem 
would be to appropriately discount future 
liabilities. 
Notes
1. These fi gures are from November, 2011. 
The most current fi gures, as of February 
2012, are 13.2 million active and 7.1 million 




2. Beta measures the sensitivity of 
fi nancial asset returns to the overall stock 
market change (i.e., using the S&P 500 index 
as a proxy). Pension asset beta captures the 
risk of a pension plan’s exposure to alternative 
investments, including private equity, venture 
capital, hedge funds, and other alternative 
assets. It was fi rst proposed by Jin, Merton, 
and Bodie (2006).
3. Allocation to private equity funds 
increased to 11 percent as of September 2011 
(Corkery 2012).
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Figure 1  State Pension Plans Equity Allocation as of Fiscal Year 2009
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Recent Books on Pensions
Education Reform and 
the Limits of Policy
Lessons from Michigan
Michael F. Addonizio 
and C. Philip Kearney
Addonizio and Kearney use Michigan as 
a laboratory to examine a set of commonly 
implemented educational reforms in an 
attempt to answer three key questions: 
1) What is the nature of these reforms? 
2) What do they hope to accomplish? and 
3) How successful have they been? 
The authors begin by examining one 















directives of the No Child Left Behind 
Act. The authors also address the growing 
trend of school choice, both the options for 
parents to select charter schools for their 
children to attend or to send them out-of-
district via a “schools of choice” program.
Finally, possibly no other school district 
in the country has suffered the decline that 
the Detroit Public Schools has. The authors 
discuss the many reasons for the district’s 
problems, efforts—including state 
oversight—to right the ship, and where 
they see the district headed as it adapts to 
the splintering of the city’s neighborhoods 
and loss of population to the suburbs. 
The book concludes with a discussion of 
what has been gleaned from the successes 
and failures of various reform efforts, and, 
based on the authors’ observations and 
analysis, their thoughts and ideas for the 





of the American 
Pension System
Was It Benefi cial for Workers?
Edward N. Wolff
Through exhaustive analysis, Wolff 
identifi es the weaknesses in the current 
private pension system and offers practical, 
policy-based 




a less daunting 
prospect for workers 
relying on 401(k) 
plans as a key source 
of retirement income 
and wealth. He 
also recognizes the importance of Social 
Security to workers and suggests ways of 
strengthening it as well.
“At last, in one place, here is all the 
data one would want on the impact on 
households of the dramatic shift from 
defi ned benefi t plans to 401(k)s. If you want 
the numbers, read this book.”—Alicia H. 
Munnell, Director, Center for Retirement 





The Search for Better Solutions
John A. Turner
“For a subject as complex and intricate 
as pension policy, this book . . . is a cogent 
and concise review of 
a core set of pension 
issues, how public 
policy in this country 
has addressed those 
issues, how they 
have been handled 
elsewhere, and what 
changes in policy 
might be appropriate 
or might succeed in 
improving pension outcomes.” –Journal of 





Facing Up to Longevity Issues 
Affecting Social Security, 
Pensions, and Older Workers
John A. Turner
Turner argues that, instead of treating 
issues relating to older age, Social Security, 
and pensions 
separately, we need 
to recognize the 
interrelationships 
among these areas 




a remarkably able 
exposition of 
policy options to address the fi nancial 





Imagining the Ideal 
Pension System
International Perspectives
Dana M. Muir and John A. Turner, eds.
Recognizing that pension systems need to 
be examined on a country-by-country basis, 
pension experts from 
10 countries gathered 
in September 2010 
to propose what they 
view as the ideal 
pension systems 
for their countries. 
The papers they 
presented are 
gathered in this new 
volume. The authors 
reveal how and why the image of an ideal 
pension system differs across countries and 
recognize the various long-term goals that 
different actors have for pension systems. 
They also address the age at which 
retirement benefi ts should be made 
available, levels of coverage that should be 
provided, risk sharing, benefi t adequacy, 
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 U.S.A. and Canada: $5.00 fi rst book, $2.00 each additional book.                             Plus Shipping $ __________
 Elsewhere: $7.00 fi rst book, $2.00 each additional book.                        
               TOTAL $ __________          
SHIP TO:
Name Organization
Address                                                                    City                          State                    Zip
BILL TO: (Must attach purchase order)
Name Organization








   for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
